As the war in Iraq drags toward the end of its fifth year, it's worth it to ponder what the first President Bush and his adviser Brent Scowcroft wrote in 1998 about why the elder Bush didn't push the first Gulf War into Iraq:
"While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in 'mission creep,' and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different—and perhaps barren—outcome."
What does the younger Bush think of his father's views on this question now? It would be worth a lot to know.
The calculations of the elder Bush and his advisers didn't add up to a perfect prophecy. The coalition didn't collapse instantly. Saddam Hussein was apprehended. But certain phrases stand out. One is "violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream." Evidently the first Bush didn't want to be putting forward a series of shifting rationales for a war like the one that has eroded the present administration's credibility.
Also worth noticing is the suggestion that part of the legacy the elder Bush wanted was "to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world"—to respond to aggression in a considered way, not go off half-cocked and become "an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land." And more important than this statement's content is the fact that he made it, acknowledging, implicitly, that leaders must be accountable—a concept unfortunately jettisoned by a new generation of Republicans.
