Ah… a little sunlight: if you've followed the deeply problematic results of touch-screen voting since 2002, you probably know that Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia) won a remarkable upset victory in 2002 over Max Cleland. Chambliss was behind in every poll, but somehow came from 5 points behind to a 7-point win, a remarkable 12-point swing. Whistleblowers later revealed the use of an unauthorized last-minute patch on Georgia's machines, implemented by order of the head of Diebold and applied in Georgia Democratic strongholds. Who knows?
In Ohio, a very interesting lawsuit has been underway for some time. In early November, Michael Connell was forced to give a sworn deposition about his interesting activities–Connell has been involved in some fashion in most of the problematic elections of recent years involving touch-screen voting, and even has some connection to the magically "lost" White House emails of recent years.
Anyway. Now Attorney Cliff Arnebeck is expanding the sweep of his Ohio lawsuit, which, one supposes, must be bearing some interesting fruit. Bradblog has extensive coverage here.
From Arnebeck's letter to Georgia's Secretary of State:
We are in the process of preparing a racketeering claim under the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act against Karl Rove as the principal perpetrator, and other individuals acting in association with him, to corrupt elections in the United States over the course of this decade.
Ground zero for this activity in 2000 was Florida, in 2004 was Ohio, and in 2002 was Georgia. In each case exit polling, the international gold standard for detection of vote count fraud, indicated fraud in the officially recorded vote for President or for the US Senate, in the case of Georgia 2002. Furthermore, the direct recording electronic voting machines, that have been used in Georgia since 2002, are the election burglary tool of choice because of the multiplicity of avenues they provide for wholesale election fraud.
This is to request any records of official investigation of the reported use of uncertified patches by Diebold in two Democratic Georgia counties in 2002, reported by former Diebold consultant Chris Hood. Also, we request protocols, inspection and audit procedures that have been prescribed to protect against other introductions of uncertified patches into federal elections in Georgia.
There may be nothing to all of this, of course. But at least we stand a chance of finding that out now, thanks to this so-far legally successful effort. Seems like Arnebeck and Company have found the key to the kingdom, if such there be.
